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Distinguishing Disparate Treatment from Disparate Impact; Confusion on
the Court

I.
Distinguishing disparate treatment and disparate impact, the primary
concepts of illegal discrimination first employed in seminal decisions1
interpreting and applying Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,2 may seem
straightforward and simple. Disparate treatment analysis asks whether an
agent of an employer has taken into account some protected status, such as
the five specified in Title VII,3 whether or not with animus, in taking some
employment action.4 Disparate impact analysis asks whether an agent of the
employer has taken some action under a policy or practice that has
1

See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (disparate treatment); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (disparate impact).
2
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
3
Section 703 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, prohibits race, color, religion, sex, and national origin
discrimination. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) of 1978 added pregnancy effectively as a sixth
category by expanding the definition of sex to include pregnancy. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). See also TAN
59-61.
4
The Court in numerous decisions has made clear that the disparate treatment proscribed by Title VII
encompasses any consideration of a protected status category that causes an adverse employment-related
decision, regardless of whether this proscribed consideration is animus-based. See, e.g., International
Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199-200 (1991) (“the absence of a malevolent
motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect”);
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 668-660 (1987) (upholding finding of unions’ intentional
discrimination despite “no suggestion below that the Unions held any racial animus against or denigrated
blacks”); Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 5463 U.S. 1073, 1084 (1983) (“use of sex-segregated
actuarial tables to calculate retirement benefits violates Title VII whether or not the tables reflect an
accurate prediction of the longevity of women as a class …”).
Title VII’s disparate treatment cause of action, which protects only the five listed status categories,
thus differs from the Constitution’s equal protection standard, which potentially protects any status group,
but requires proof of some level of animus or lack of equal regard, even for classifications – unlike race -that do not raise heightened suspicions of such animus for the Court. See, e.g., Rohmer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 635 (1996) (“We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper
legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.”); City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (“requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational
prejudice against the mildly retarded”); New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 588
(1979) (“we are necessarily confronted with the question whether the rule reflects an impermissible bias
against a special class“ of narcotic users). See generally John Ely, Democracy and Distrust 135-97 (1980).

1
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disproportionate adverse effects on members of a group defined by a
protected status.5 The former is illegal regardless of any business
justification, except in rare cases where a protected status (other than race or
color) is used as a bona fide occupational qualification.6 The latter is illegal
only where an employer cannot demonstrate an over weighing necessary
business goal or the plaintiff can demonstrate an alternate means to achieve
such a demonstrated goal without the adverse effects.7 Under current law,
the former warrants legal as well as equitable relief, while the latter warrants
only the equitable.8
But even the wise men and women on the Supreme Court continue to
have difficulty distinguishing the two. In two decisions in the 2014-2015
Term, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.9 and Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc.,10 the Court seemed
to give contradictory answers to an important unresolved conceptual
definitional question: Does disparate treatment include assigning members
of a protected group based on their protected status to a larger disfavored
group that is defined by neutral principles and that includes others who are
not members of the protected group? Or does such assignment have only a
disparate impact on the protected status group?
In Young, the first of these decisions, all members of the Court,
though divided on the appropriate analysis, seemed to assume that
consideration of protected status in assigning an individual to a more broadly
defined larger disfavored group is not overt disparate treatment. Justice
Breyer’s decision for the five-member majority in Young11and Justice
Alito’s concurring opinion12 both seemed to agree with Justice Scalia’s

5

See, e.g., Griggs, supra, at 431-432.
The bona fide occupational qualification defense applies only to religion, sex and national origin
discrimination, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
7
The disparate impact cause of action was codified at § 703(k) of Title VII by § 105 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k). This codification provides that an “unlawful employment practice
based on disparate impact is established under this title only if (i) a complaining party demonstrates that …
a particular employment practice … causes a disparate impact … and the respondent fails to demonstrate
that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity; or (ii) the complaining party [demonstrates a satisfactory “alternative employment practice”] …
that “the respondent refuses to adopt.”
8
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(a)(1).
9
135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
10
135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).
11
135 S. Ct. at 1343, discussed TAN 61-71 infra.
12
Id. at 1356, discussed at note 81 infra.
6

2
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opinion for the three dissenters13 that the light duty accommodation policy of
United Parcel Service (UPS) for disabled drivers could not be treated as
overt illegal disparate treatment against the protected category of pregnancy,
even though UPS’s policy considered the pregnancy-based origins of Peggy
Young’s lifting disability in assigning her disability to a larger residual
category of disabilities that UPS did not favor with the accommodation of
temporary light duty work.14
In Abercrombie, however, a conceptually identical case involving
alleged religion-based rather than pregnancy-based discrimination, eight
members of the Court held that consideration of a protected religious
practice under a general policy that defined a larger group to be disfavored is
illegal disparate treatment, absent the availability of a statutory defense.15
These eight members concluded that disparate treatment analysis was
appropriate for Abercrombie’s application of its neutral “Look Policy”
against the wearing of “caps” to deny employment to Samantha Elauf, a
young Muslim woman who wore a hijab scarf to her job interview, despite
the fact that the neutral policy defined a larger disfavored group that
included non-religious cap-wearers. Only Justice Thomas, in a separate
opinion that argued that Abercrombie’s neutral policy could be challenged
only for its disparate impact on certain religious practices,16 maintained
consistency with the conceptual definition of disparate treatment apparently
accepted by all members of the Court in Young.
In my view, the Court’s decision in Young was unfortunate. This is
not only because the majority opinion, as I will explain below,17 diluted the
Pregnancy Amendment Act (PDA)18 amendments to Title VII with a
confusing opinion that provided incomplete guidance for future cases or
even the Young case itself on remand. It is also because the opinion
weakened the appropriate clarification that the Abercrombie decision might
have given to the conceptual line between the disparate treatment and
disparate impact forms of discrimination proscribed by Title VII.
13

Id. at 1361, discussed TAN 72-84 infra.
UPS at least purported to accommodate only “(1) drivers who had become disabled on the job, (2) those
who had lost their Department of Transportation (DOT) certifications, and (3) those who suffered from a
disability covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).” 135 S. Ct. at 1344.
15
135 S. Ct. at 2031 (majority opinion of Justice Scalia for seven Justices), 2034 (concurring opinion of
Justice Alito).
16
Id. at 2037.
17
See TAN 61-71 infra.
18
86 Stat. 103, Pub. L. 95-555, §1, Oct. 31, 1978, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
14

3

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2684114

In the remainder of this essay, I first explain why disparate treatment
analysis is appropriate in cases where protected status is taken into account
under a more general policy that defines a disfavored group that
encompasses but is more inclusive than the protected status. I then use this
explanation to defend the use of disparate treatment analysis in Abercrombie
and to criticize the Justices for not applying it in Young. My criticism of the
Young decision includes a further explanation of the sources of the Justices’
lack of perception, and enables me to conclude with a message of hope for a
future perception and clarification not obstructed by the same sources.

II.
It is illuminating to begin with the Court’s resolution of a conceptual
distinction of disparate treatment from disparate impact that might be
considered the converse of the issue at the core of Abercrombie and Young.
The converse question is whether discrimination against a non-protected
status category that is totally encompassed within but is not identical with a
larger protected status category can be challenged as disparate treatment of
the larger category’s protected status or rather must be challenged only for
its disparate impact on the protected status. This was the conceptual question
at the core of the pre-PDA challenge to the disability plan considered by the
Court in General Electric Company v. Gilbert.19 The disability plan
challenged in that case paid weekly sickness and accident benefits, but
expressly excluded from the plan’s coverage disabilities arising from
pregnancy. Since only women can become pregnant, all those disadvantaged
were a subset of a Title VII protected status group. Justice Rehnquist’s
decision for the Court, however, holds that since there was no finding that
General Electric’s exclusion of pregnancy from its plan was based on
consideration of the sex of those who might become pregnant, no finding
that it was “a simple pretext for discrimination against women,”20 it could be
challenged, if at all, only for a disparate impact on women.21 The plan’s
exclusion of pregnancy was intentional discrimination against pregnancy,
the defining status characteristic considered under the exclusion, but it was
not intentional discrimination against women, the protected status that
encompassed all those who were not provided benefits.
19

429 U.S. 125 (1976).
Id. at 136.
21
Id. at 137.
20

4

The Gilbert decision supported bad public policy and of course was
soon reversed by the passage of the PDA. The Court’s pre-PDA resolution
of the underlying conceptual question nonetheless made sense. Absent a
factual finding that an employer took into account the protected category
defining the larger set (women) when deciding to disfavor those in the
subset (pregnancy), there is no basis for concluding that the adverse
decisions were influenced by some consideration of the protected status of
sex, rather than by other considerations, such as cost. Unlike in cases like
Phillips v. Martin Marietta,22 condemning discrimination against a subset of
all women, that basis cannot be provided in subset discrimination cases like
Gilbert by locating comparators outside the protected status who share the
characteristic defining the disfavored subset. In Martin Marietta, the
employer hired some women, but not those with preschool aged children,
while it did hire men with such children.23 The latter hiring proved that the
employer was influenced in part by protected status in its disfavoring of the
subset of women with young children. Such proof of course is not available
in the rare case, like Gilbert, where the non-protected status, like pregnancy
(pre-PDA), cannot be shared by those outside the protected status defining
the larger set.
Illustration 1 – General Electric v. Gilbert

Women

Pregnant
Women

Cases like Young and Abercrombie, where protected status defines the
subset but not the set, are distinguishable from cases like Gilbert, where
protected status defines the set but not the subset. In the former cases, there
is no factual dispute over whether protected status – such as pregnancy or
22
23

400 U.S. 542 (1971).
Id. at 543.
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the religious practice of wearing head scarves -- has been considered by the
employer when assigning individuals defined by such status to a larger set of
disfavored individuals defined by unprotected categories. Moreover, as in
cases like Martin Marietta, there are readily available comparators to
confirm such consideration. There are many favored individuals outside the
plaintiff’s protected status group who are in all potentially relevant respects
identical to the plaintiff except for the protected status.

Illustration 2 – Young v. United Parcel Service

Disfavored
Conditions

Pregnancy-Based
Conditions

Illustration 3 – EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch

Wearers of Head Covers

Wearers of
Religious
Head
Covers

Cases like Young and Abercrombie, where the employer assigns all
those in a protected status (the pregnant; women wearing a hijab) to a larger
disfavored group (those with disfavored disabilities; those who wear head
covers) not defined by such status, also are distinguishable from
paradigmatic disparate impact cases where protected status defines neither a
set nor a subset of the disfavored and is not considered by the employer
when determining disfavored status. For instance, in Griggs v. Duke Power
6

Co.24, the Supreme Court decision that first pronounced a Title VII disparate
impact cause of action, the employer presumably applied high school
education and aptitude test score requirements for employment without any
consideration of the race-based status disproportionately affected by the
neutral requirements. Or in Dothard v. Rawlinson,25 the Court’s first
application of the disparate impact to sex discrimination, the employer
presumably applied minimum height and weight requirements for prisonguard employment without any consideration of the sex-based status
disproportionately affected by the neutral requirements.
Illustration 4 – Griggs v. Duke Power

Workers
without
High
School
Diploma
in North
Carolina

African
American
Workers
in North
Carolina

What makes cases like Young and Abercrombie, where protected
status defines the subset rather than the set, conceptually difficult is the fact
that there also are otherwise identical individuals – other comparators -outside the plaintiff’s protected subset, but within the larger set, who are
disfavored. Ultimately, however, the unfavorable treatment of these other
comparators should not insulate such cases from disparate treatment
analysis. The statutory language in § 703(a)(1) of Title VII on which the
disparate treatment cause of action is based makes it “an unlawful
employment practice for an employer … to discriminate against any
individual … because of such individual’s” protected status.26 Such
proscribed discrimination can occur where individuals in the plaintiff’s
protected class are not the only disfavored individuals; disparate treatment
analysis only must determine whether the plaintiff’s protected status made a
difference in his treatment. Consider, for example, a national origin
discrimination case brought by a Croatian-American against a SerbianAmerican owned business that the Croatian claimed discriminated against
24

401 U.S. 424 (1971).
433 U.S. 321 (1977).
26
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
25

7

her because of her ethnic background. If the Croatian could present favored
Serbian-American comparators, she could establish disparate treatment on
the basis of national origin, regardless of whether the employer could
present equally disfavored Slovenian-American or Bosnian-American
comparators.

Illustration 5 – Croatian-American Hypothetical

Non-Serbian Southern
Slavic Americans

Croatian
Americans

This Balkanized hypothetical admittedly does not fully capture the
discrimination in the Young and Abercrombie cases because in my
hypothetical the employer seems to be disfavoring the Croatian not under a
legal neutral policy, but rather under a general policy of discrimination
against anyone of at least Southeastern European, non-Serbian descent, a
general policy defining the larger set that is itself as illegal a form of
national origin discrimination as is any more particularized form of
discrimination against the plaintiff’s subset of Croatian-Americans. Indeed,
it generally will be true that other disfavored comparators outside the
plaintiff’s protected class-defined subset but within a larger encompassing
set, also will have a similar cause of action to that of the plaintiff for any
form of status discrimination subject to universalistic and symmetrical
prohibitions. Such prohibitions, such as those against race, non-pregnancy
sex, national origin, and forms of religious discrimination in Title VII, can
be invoked in the same manner by all and cut equally in all directions.27 For
such prohibitions, it is difficult to imagine realistic cases where larger sets of
disfavored workers include comparators who do not have similar causes of
27

See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (holding that whites employees
can challenge adverse treatment because of their race under Title VII).

8

action to those encompassed within the illegally defined subsets of
workers.28
As further explained below, the prohibition of pregnancy
discrimination embodied within Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination
and the prohibition of the type of religious discrimination at issue in
Abercrombie, however, are both more like the non-universalistic and
asymmetrical prohibitions of age and disability discrimination contained in
the ADEA and the ADA respectively. The prohibition of age discrimination
in the ADEA is non-universalistic and asymmetrical because the statute
protects only those forty and older and does so only against age
discrimination that favors younger workers.29 The prohibition of disability
discrimination by the ADA is non-universalistic and asymmetrical because it
protects only the limited class of disabled workers and does not protect the
non-disabled from any discrimination in favor of the disabled.
The ADEA and the ADA thus may present more realistic testing
hypotheticals closer to the facts of Young and Abercrombie. Consider a
policy against hiring workers older than age 30. Under such a policy the
larger disfavored class would include comparators between the ages of 30
and 40 who would not have a cause of action for age discrimination like the
protected subset of disfavored workers over the age of 40. Presumably, this
latter subset of workers should and would be able to claim overt disparate
treatment on the basis of age despite being included by the employer’s

28

But not difficult for a law professor to imagine unrealistic hypotheticals, like the employer who sincerely
hates very curly hair and therefore refuses under this neutral principle to hire anyone that he knows is of
African descent regardless of the current length or style of their hair. Even if the neutral principle is not a
pretext for the disfavoring of blacks (which of course it realistically would be), the employer’s policy
presumably would and should be treated as overt disparate treatment on the basis of race because the
disfavored status-protected subset of blacks is included within the larger disfavored set that is defined by a
unprotected status, very curly hair.
29
See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (limiting protections “to individuals who are at least 40 years of age”); General
Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004 (holding the ADEA does not prohibit favoring
older workers over younger workers).
It is conceptually possible to have a discrimination prohibition that is non-universalistic, but
symmetric. This was how the dissenters in Cline, for instance, interpreted the ADEA. See id. at 602 (Justice
Thomas, dissenting); id. at 601 (Justice Scalia, dissenting). Such a prohibition, however, cannot function
consistently in practice. If the dissenters’ view of the ADEA was correct – if the Act prohibited
discrimination against the younger as well as against the older – then an employer could not favor older
workers in the 40 and over protected class, but only workers in this protected class could object. Thus, an
employer with impunity could have a policy of hiring only those 40 and over because the policy disfavored
no workers in the protected class, but the employer could not have a policy of hiring only those 50 and over
because such a policy would disfavor protected workers between their 40th and 50th birthdays.

9

policy within a larger set of workers that includes many who could not claim
such discrimination.30
Illustration 6 – ADEA Hypothetical
Workers 30 and Over

Workers 40 and
Over

It might be argued that the larger set in the last hypothetical is itself
defined by an age-based policy unfavorable to older workers, even if it
includes some comparators with no cause of action. But consider a
hypothetical based on the current ADA. Assume an employer has a policy
against employing permanent workers whose body mass index (BMI) is
above a particular level and that the employer consequently does not hire
anyone who it deems unable to reach this BMI within six months. The
employer thus rejects any applicant for employment whom it knows to be
obese because of a difficult-to-control physiological condition. Assuming, as

30

Indeed, the opinions in an ADEA case decided by the Court in 2008, Kentucky Retirement
Systems v. EEOC, 554 U.S. 135 (2008), suggest that the current Justices would recognize as ADEAproscribed disparate treatment the age-based assignment of older workers to a less favorable status under a
broader neutrally, defined policy. In this case, the Court considered a challenge to Kentucky’s disability
retirement plan, based on the plan’s treatment of some “disabled individuals more generously than it treats
some of those who become disabled only after becoming eligible for retirement” and their normal pension,
an eligibility that depended in part on age. Id. at 138. Justice Kennedy, in a dissent for three other Justices
(Scalia, Ginsburg, and Alito) also currently on the Court, id. at 150, argued that the Kentucky system was
“a straightforward act of discrimination on the basis of age,” id. at 152, even though he did not question
Kentucky’s good faith attempt to align a disabled worker’s pension with the pension he would have earned
had he worked until retirement age without a disability. Justice Kennedy did not find relevant Kentucky’s
use of the neutral broader principle of pension eligibility, finding the case no different than one where “an
employer divided his employees into two teams based upon age -- putting all workers over the age of 65 on
“Team A” and all other workers on “Team B” – and then paid Team B members twice the salary of their
Team A counterparts.” Id. at 158.
The other five Justices joined in an opinion by Justice Breyer, id. at 137, that upheld the Kentucky plan
based primarily on the ADEA’s special treatment of pensions, but cautioned “that our opinion in no way
unsettles the rule that a statute or policy that facially discriminates based on age suffices to show disparate
treatment under the ADEA. We are dealing today with the quite special case of differential treatment based
on pension status, where pension status – with the explicit blessing of the ADEA itself turns, in part, on
age.” Id. at 147-148.
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courts have held,31 that such physiologically based obesity is a disability
protected from discrimination by the ADA, but that being overweight or
even obese generally is not,32 the employer’s assignment of the protected
subset of the physiologically obese to its excluded neutrally defined set of
unacceptably overweight workers should and, I think, would be treated as
illegal overt disparate treatment of the disabled subset.

Illustration 7 – ADA Hypothetical

Very Overweight
Workers

Physiologically
Obese

Workers

It is difficult to distinguish this ADA hypothetical conceptually from
either Young or Abercrombie. In each case, the employer is culpable of
considering a category protected from discrimination as the basis for
assigning workers to a larger set of disfavored workers defined by principles
that are neutral under the antidiscrimination laws. In each case those neutral
principles not only advantage comparators outside the protected subset, but
also disadvantage comparators who are within the larger set, but not the
protected subset. Each case should be treated alike and that treatment should
be as overt disparate treatment on the basis of the category defining the
protected subset of workers.
An explanation of why the Court nonetheless did not afford Peggy
Young as a member of a protected subset of pregnant workers the benefit of
overt disparate treatment protection can best follow an analysis of why the
Court inconsistently did afford this benefit to Samantha Elauf, the hijabwearing Muslim woman, in Abercrombie.
31

See, e.g., Cook v. State of Rhode Island Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals, 10 F.3d 17
(1st Cir. 1992) (finding an impairment because obese woman demonstrated her obesity was caused by a
physiological condition).
32
See, e.g., EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2006).
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III.
The issue presented and directly decided by the Court in Abercrombie
was not the conceptual distinction of disparate treatment discrimination that
I am treating in this essay. The Court instead granted certiorari in
Abercrombie to resolve a split in the Courts of Appeals on whether an
employer’s duty under Title VII to not treat adversely an employee or
applicant for employment because of her religious practice applies only
when the employee or applicant has informed the employer that the practice
is religion-based and thus might require some accommodation.33 Justice
Scalia’s opinion for a seven Justice majority holds that the employer’s duty
is not so conditioned, that an employee or applicant can “show disparate
treatment without first showing that an employer has “actual knowledge” of
the applicant’s need for an accommodation.”34 It is sufficient for a plaintiff
to demonstrate that the employer was motivated by its agent’s consideration
of the plaintiff’s religious practice, whether or not it knew that the practice
actually was based on religion. Justice Scalia founded the holding primarily
on the wording of the statutory provision that expresses Title VII’s
prohibition of disparate treatment discrimination on the basis of religion, or
of race, color, sex, and national origin. That provision, § 703(a)(1) of the
Act, Justice Scalia stressed, requires only that the plaintiff prove that a
discriminatory motive caused the adverse employment decision, such as the
failure to hire, about which the plaintiff complains.35 The provision does not
include any kind of knowledge requirement.
This interpretation of § 703(a)(1) has little import for most status
discrimination cases. An employer cannot be motivated to treat an employee
or applicant adversely on the basis of some protected status, such as race or
sex, of which it is not aware. The same is true for the status of religious
affiliation or belief. However, Title VII defines the status category of
religion to include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well
as belief,”36 and employers may treat employees or applicants differently
because of some practice, such as the wearing of particular clothing, without
33

Compare Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1993), with EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch
Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2013).
34
135 S. Ct. at 2032.
35
Id. at 2032-2033.
36
42 U.S.C. §2000e(j).
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being told or knowing for certain the reason for the practice. So for cases
like Abercrombie that involve alleged discrimination against a religious
practice, the holding is important.
It probably does not mean, however, that an employer can be liable
for discrimination against a religious practice without the plaintiff showing
that the employer had some reason at least to be suspicious that the practice
might be religion-based. As Justice Alito argued in his concurring opinion,
there certainly was such a showing in this case.37 The record indicated that
the Abercrombie employee who interviewed Samantha Elauf thought she
wore a scarf to the interview for religious reasons,38 and this belief was
communicated to the district manager who told the interviewer to not hire
her.39 Without an employer’s agents having some reason to think a practice
might have a religious basis, it is hard to discern a motive to treat religion
adversely. As Justice Alito argued, there would not be “any blameworthy
conduct.”40 It thus was not surprising that Justice Scalia in a footnote
allowed, while declining to resolve “by way of dictum,” that “it is arguable
that the motive requirement itself is not met unless the employer at least
suspects that the practice in question is a religious practice.”41
The need for some level of suspicion of a religious basis for the
disfavored practice on which to base the employer’s culpability seems
particularly important because, as noted, Justice Scalia expressly treated
Abercrombie’s rejection of Elauf as “disparate-treatment” rather than
disparate impact discrimination under the statutory provision on which
disparate treatment analysis is based. Indeed, the Court could not have used
disparate impact theory to review the Court of Appeals’ decision to overturn
a jury award of damages based on disparate treatment.
Justice Thomas was the only member of the Court to dissent from
Justice Scalia’s acceptance of disparate treatment analysis in the case. To
Justice Thomas, it was “a classic case of an alleged disparate impact”
because Abercrombie “did not treat religious practices less favorably than
similar secular practices.”42 Justice Thomas did not need to know whether
Abercrombie had any suspicion of whether Elauf had a religious motivation
37

135 S.Ct. at 2034.
Id. at 2031.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 2036.
41
Id. at 2033, n.3
42
Id. at 2037, 2038.
38
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before applying its Look Policy to her because Abercrombie would have
applied the same policy to secular comparators. Justice Thomas failed to
perceive any difference between a case, like Abercrombie, where an
employer considers a protected status as a basis for assigning an employee to
a larger set of disfavored workers, and a paradigmatic disparate impact case,
like Griggs, where an employer’s challenged practice merely has a
disproportionate effect on a protected group without any direct consideration
of protected status.
Justice Scalia included two responses to Justice Thomas in his
majority opinion. The second of these responses was not alone persuasive, as
it did no more than note that Title VII’s protection of religious “practice” is
asymmetrical and not universalistic. Thus, Justice Scalia’s assertion that
Title VII “does not demand mere neutrality with regard to religious
practices,” but rather “gives them favored treatment”43 not given to religious
practices, merely explained why Title VII’s protection against religious
discrimination, like the ADA and the ADEA prohibitions discussed above, is
more likely to pose the conceptual problem that is the subject of this essay; it
did not explain why it should be answered differently than does Justice
Thomas.
Justice Scalia includes in this second response an assertion that “Title
VII requires otherwise-neutral policies to give way to the need for an
accommodation.”44 But the accommodation requirement is not relevant to
the question of whether differential treatment of someone because they
engaged in a practice that turns out to be religious is Title VII disparate
treatment when that same treatment would be given to the practice if it were
secular. The provision upon which Title VII disparate treatment is based, §
703(a)(1), treats discrimination on the basis of religion the same as the
prohibition of the other prohibited forms of discrimination and it contains no
reference to accommodation. The only mention of accommodation is in the
affirmative defense provided to employers in the definition of religion to
include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
accommodate … without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s
business.”45 The accommodation-undue hardship defense thus is only
relevant to determining what is protected as religion under Title VII’s
43

Id. at 2034.
Id.
45
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
44
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disparate treatment provision; it does not define the conceptual scope of
disparate treatment.
Justice Scalia’s first response to Justice Thomas, however, seems a
more direct rejection of Justice Thomas’s answer to the underlying
conceptual question. Justice Scalia states that Justice Thomas might be
correct “if Congress had limited the meaning of “religion” in Title VII to
religious belief --- so that discriminating against a particular religious
practice would not be disparate treatment though it might have disparate
impact.”46 But since “religious practice is one of [Title VII’s] protected
characteristics,”47 differential treatment of someone engaged in the practice
can constitute disparate treatment, regardless of whether that differential
treatment is consistent with more general policies.
In his response to Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion, Justice
Alito takes the same position more directly.48 In order to prove
discrimination under Title VII’s disparate treatment provision, asserts Justice
Alito, a “plaintiff need not show … that the employer took the adverse
action because of the religious nature of the practice. … Suppose, for
example, that an employer rejected all applicants who refuse to work on
Saturday, whether for religious or nonreligious reasons. Applicants whose
refusal to work on Saturday was known by the employer to be based on
religion will have been rejected because of a religious practice.”49 Justice
Alito then supports this conclusion by noting that there would be no need to
provide the reasonable accommodation-undue hardship “defense” in the
definition of religion if the disparate treatment provision – the provision
covering all forms of Title VII discrimination – did not have this meaning.50
Thus, had it stood alone in the 2014-2015 Term of the Court, EEOC v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores would have provided strong support for a
conceptual definition of Title VII disparate treatment to include assigning
members of a protected status group to a larger disfavored group that
includes others who are not members of the protected group. Abercrombie
did this by assigning Muslim women engaging in a religious practice to the
larger disfavored group of “cap” wearers. But Abercrombie did not stand
46
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alone as a case relevant to the conceptual definition. Two months before
Abercrombie, in Young v. UPS, the Court had seemed to assume a different
conceptual definition of Title VII disparate treatment in a case involving the
application of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) amendment to Title
VII.
IV.
The PDA added a definition of sex, right after the definition of
religion, in the definitional section of Title VII. The first clause of this
definition states that ““because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but
are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions.”51 By folding pregnancy discrimination into the
category of sex, this clause effectively expanded from five to six the
categories covered by Title VII’s prohibitions of discrimination, including
the employer disparate treatment prohibition, § 703(a)(1).52 Had a majority
of the Justices in Young interpreted the latter prohibition in the same manner
that they interpreted it two months later in Abercrombie, the answer to the
conceptual question posed in this essay would be clear.
UPS required Young, a part-time driver, to stay home without pay,
causing an eventual loss of medical coverage, during most of her pregnancy
when she could not lift the minimum weight that UPS required its drivers to
be able to lift. UPS denied Young’s request to be accommodated with help
on the lifting of heavy packages. It based its denial on the cause of Young’s
lifting restriction, her pregnancy, deciding that this cause did not fit any of
the three categories of disability causes that it accommodated under its
general personnel policy. Under that policy, UPS accommodated (1) drivers
who had become disabled on the job, (2) those who had lost their
Department of Transportation (DOT) certification as drivers, and (3) those
who suffered from a disability covered by the ADA.53 Young’s pregnancy
disabled her off the job, did not cause her to lose her DOT certification as a
driver, and was not covered as a disability at that time under the ADA
because it was only temporary. Thus, UPS considered Young’s protected
status of pregnancy in placing her in a larger set of neutrally defined
disfavored workers, just as Abercrombie considered Elauf’s religious head
scarf in placing her in a larger set of neutrally defined disfavored workers.
51
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In both cases, of course, there were other members of the disfavored
set – secular cap-wearers in Abercrombie; workers with other off-the-job
caused lifting restrictions in Young – who were not provided
accommodations under neutral company policy. These other disfavored
workers would continue to be disadvantaged even if discrimination against
the religious and the pregnant were eliminated. This was not a problem in
Abercrombie because, as noted above,54 Title VII’s prohibition of
discrimination against religious practice is both non-universalistic and
asymmetrical; Title VII does not protect secular practices and it does not
prohibit accommodations favoring religious practices over secular practices.
It need not have been a problem in Young either, however, because the Court
already had held that the PDA’s prohibition of pregnancy discrimination
also is both non-universalistic and asymmetrical; the PDA does not protect
other conditions or disabilities and it does not prohibit employers from
favoring pregnancy.
The Court rendered this holding in California Federal Savings and
Loan Association v. Guerra,55 a decision that could have guided the decision
in Young, but was not part of the central analysis of any opinion in the case.
Guerra involved a preemption challenge to a California law that required
employers to provide female employees an unpaid pregnancy disability
leave of up to four months,56 but did not require the provision of such leave
to workers disabled for other reasons. The plaintiff employer argued that this
California law conflicted with the federal PDA because the state law allowed
employers to provide a type of preferential treatment for pregnancy that the
employer construed the PDA to prohibit. The Court rejected the preemption
challenge in part57 because it rejected the employer’s construction of the
PDA to prohibit preferential treatment of pregnancy. Rather, the Court
agreed “with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Congress intended the
PDA to be a “floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not
drop --- not a ceiling above which they may not rise.””58 An employer who
54
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complied with the California law thus would not be in violation of the PDA
if it did not provide comparable benefits to other disabilities.
The same would be true for UPS had it treated pregnancy restrictions
as well as the three categories of restrictions favored by its policies. It would
not have illegally discriminated against any others whose restrictions were
disfavored for reasons other than their being pregnancy-based. It would not
have violated the non-universalistic and asymmetrical PDA by
accommodating Young any more than Abercrombie would have violated the
non-universalistic and asymmetrical Title VII prohibition of discrimination
against religious practices had it accommodated Elauf.
Nonetheless, none of the opinions in Young used Guerra as guiding
precedent to decide the case under the first clause of the PDA. Each opinion
assumed, perhaps encouraged by a surprising concession from Young’s
attorney, that Young would lose her case if she had only the first clause on
which to rely.59 Each assumed that the case instead turned primarily on the
meaning of a second clause that states “and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability
or inability to work.”60 This second clause does not modify disparate
treatment principles, but simply clarifies that these principles apply in cases
where pregnancy affects or is regarded as affecting the ability to work.61 It
was in the opinions’ interpretation of this clause that all of the Justices
seemed to accept a different conceptual definition of intentional
discrimination than that assumed by eight Justices in Abercrombie.
Justice Breyer’s opinion for the majority in Young expressly rejects an
interpretation of the second clause offered by Young that would have
interpreted the PDA consistently with the interpretation that the Court in
Abercrombie seemed to give to Title VII’s general disparate treatment
prohibition in § 703(a)(1). Justice Breyer’s opinion rejects Young’s
contention “that the second clause means that whenever “an employer
accommodates only a subset of workers with disabling conditions,” a court
59
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should find a Title VII violation if “pregnant workers who are similar in the
ability to work” do not “receive the same [accommodation] even if still other
non-pregnant workers do not receive accommodations.”62 This rejected
interpretation is conceptually the same as the Court’s assumption in
Abercrombie about the meaning of the disparate treatment prohibition of
discrimination against religious practices.
Justice Breyer oddly rejects this interpretation because it would grant
the pregnant a “most-favored-nation” status.63 But granting a most-favorednation status to a protected group is what all anti-discrimination law does in
effect. My hypothetical Croatian-American who is rejected by a SerbianAmerican employer wants to claim Croatia as equal to the favored Serbian
nation. The Croatian’s national origin discrimination claim is not different
from Young’s pregnancy discrimination claim except for the fact that those
of all other national origins also can claim “most-favored-nation” status
because the prohibition of national origin discrimination in Title VII, unlike
the prohibition of pregnancy discrimination, has a universalistic sweep.
Justice Breyer claims that the second clause cannot grant a “mostfavored-nation” status because it would mean that an employer could not
grant greater accommodations to some workers because of “the nature of
their jobs, the employer’s need to keep them working, their ages, or any
other criteria .…If Congress intended to allow differences in treatment
arising out of special duties, special service, or special needs, why would it
not also have wanted courts to take account of differences arising out of
special causes…?”64 Justice Breyer’s claim is baffling because the answer to
his question is obvious: Congress, by requiring employers to treat the
pregnant as well as comparators whose work limitations had other causes,
prohibited discrimination against a particular cause of an inability to work,
pregnancy, and in favor of other such causes;65 it did not prohibit
discrimination favoring those who performed particular jobs, or favoring
those who are particularly valuable to an employer, or favoring those who
are older. Presumably, Justice Breyer and other members of the Court would
have no difficulty granting the Croatian-American “most-favored-nation”
status in a case where he challenged a Serbian receiving twice the Croatian’s
pay for the same work, even though the Croatian could not claim
62
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discrimination if the Serbian’s better treatment was because of his “special
duties, special service, or special needs.”66
One might surmise that the Court’s restriction of the reach of
disparate treatment analysis in pregnancy discrimination cases derived from
some uncertainty about the purpose of the second clause of the PDA. Yet,
Justice Breyer indicated that Young’s disparate treatment case must rely on
this second clause to expand her protection, that it is not enough for the PDA
to have included pregnancy as a protected status, because “disparatetreatment law normally permits an employer” to do what UPS did to Young:
“implement policies that are not intended to harm members of a protected
class, even if their implementation sometimes harms those members, as long
as the employer has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual reason
for doing so.”67 Moreover, Justice Breyer’s opinion asserts that the second
clause is necessary to fulfill Congress’ intent to overrule Gilbert because in
that case General Electric had a neutral policy defining a disfavored subset
of disabilities -- those not derived from accidents or illnesses -- that at least
might include others than those included within the protected status of the
pregnant. Thus, the majority opinion in Young seems to assume that Title
VII’s general prohibition of disparate treatment does not encompass
consideration of protected status in the assignment of employees to a
neutrally defined larger set of disfavored employees.
Justice Breyer’s consequent interpretation of the second clause of the
PDA in order to ensure the overruling of Gilbert will be hard for lower court
judges to understand. On the one hand, Justice Breyer’s opinion seems to do
no more than explain how an employer’s intent to treat pregnancy worse
than other similar causes of a disability could be uncovered through use of
the framework first set forth by the Court for § 703(a)(1) cases in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green68 to uncover covert discriminatory intent through
proof that an ostensibly neutral reason is a pretextual cover for proscribed
intentional discrimination. If this is all Justice Breyer means, however, the
opinion ultimately adopts a reading of the second clause of the PDA that
does not after all expand on the narrowly interpreted first clause, but rather
66
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simply confirms the first clause’s directive that pregnancy be added to the
five original protected status categories.
On the other hand, Justice Breyer’s opinion might be read to merge
the balancing of disparate impact analysis into the McDonnell Douglas
framework to make proof of pretext easier in pregnancy discrimination cases
than in other disparate treatment cases. The opinion even rejects, at least
“normally,” as “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons,”69 the quite credible
rationales of expense and convenience.70 Then, borrowing a justificationbased balancing analysis from disparate impact law, the opinion states that a
“plaintiff may reach a jury” on the issue of pretext “by providing sufficient
evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on
pregnant workers, and the employer’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory”
reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather – when
considered along with the burden imposed – give rise to an inference of
intentional discrimination.”71 An interpretation of the second clause of the
PDA to make proof of pretext easier than in other § 703(a)(1) cases,
however, has absolutely no support in the language of that clause, and is a
policy-based compromise more appropriate for Congress than for the Court.
As part of the compromise, it also provides an unclear direction to lower
courts to treat differently, and unpredictably, pregnancy discrimination cases
depending on the number of other workers accommodated and the reasons
for such accommodations.
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia has a great deal of fun in his dissent
ridiculing Justice Breyer’s creative, but vulnerable opinion, especially the
apparent merging of disparate impact and disparate treatment analysis.
Justice Scalia is not easily fooled by sleights of hand. He fully understands
that any reading of the second clause of the PDA to merge disparate impact
balancing analysis into the McDonnel Douglas framework finds no support
in the language of that clause and that without such a reading, Breyer’s
opinion has “just marched up and down the hill” claiming the second clause
is not redundant and superfluous: “If the clause merely instructed courts to
consider a policy’s effects and justifications the way it considers other
circumstantial evidence of motive, it would be superfluous. So the Court’s
balancing test must mean something else. Even if the effects and
justifications of policies are not enough to show intent to discriminate under
69
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ordinary Title VII principles, they could (Poof!) still show intent to
discriminate for purpose of the pregnancy same-treatment clause.
Deliciously incoherent.”72
Justice Scalia, however, has his fun only after choosing an
interpretation of the second clause that rejects the broader conceptual
definition of disparate treatment covered by § 703(a)(1) that he embraced
two months later for religious discrimination in Abercrombie. Justice Scalia
correctly asserts that the second clause of the PDA has “two conceivable
readings.”73 But he goes astray in not seeing that the first “most natural way
to understand the same-treatment clause”74 encompasses both of those
readings, and that his second reading is only a straw man. The second
reading, advanced neither by Young nor the government, is that pregnant
women must be given the “the same accommodations as others, no matter
the differences (other than pregnancy) between them.”75 Justice Scalia easily
burns the straw man in the same confused manner that Justice Breyer claims
to dismiss a most-favored-nation interpretation of the PDA.76 “Prohibiting
employers from making any distinctions between pregnant workers and
others of similar ability” would mean if a company “offered chauffeurs to
injured directors, it would have to offer chauffeurs to pregnant mechanics”
and if it “paid pensions to workers who can no longer work because of old
age, it would have to pay pensions to workers who can no longer work
because of childbirth.”77
Having thus charred what no one argued, Justice Scalia thereby
reasonably concludes that the “same-treatment,” second clause of the PDA
must condemn only distinguishing “between pregnant women and others of
similar ability because of pregnancy.”78 But Justice Scalia seems blind to
what he perceived in Abercrombie, that the same because of language in §
703(a)(1) can encompass consideration of a protected status under a more
general neutral policy, as well as consideration of a protected status without
72
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reference to such a policy. Thus, perhaps in part because the majority failed
to advance the more expansive definition of intentional discrimination
Justice Scalia later embraced in Abercrombie, he asserts that the only
reasonable interpretation of the PDA requires a rejection of Young’s
disparate treatment case.
Apart from its inconsistency with his Abercrombie opinion, Justice
Scalia’s narrow reading of the PDA is even more troubling than Justice
Breyer’s incoherent reading. This narrow reading forced Justice Scalia to
interpret the Congressional intent to overturn Gilbert to be limited to
ensuring a favorable result in the easier case the Gilbert dissenters described
to argue their pre-PDA case for sex discrimination: where an employer
“singled out” only pregnancy-related conditions for exclusion from some
disability benefit.79 Justice Scalia thereby adopts what is in effect a “leastfavored-nation” interpretation of the PDA. An employer engages in
actionable pregnancy discrimination only when it treats pregnancy-related
disabilities less favorably than all, or perhaps in pretext analysis almost all,
other disabilities.
Justice Scalia’s “least-favored-nation” reading of the PDA, like
Justice Breyer’s rejection of a “most-favored-nation” reading, was not
consistent with the Court’s earlier decision in Guerra. Because it held that
the PDA sets a floor, but not a ceiling, for pregnancy benefits,80 Guerra
should have settled how the PDA treats a case like Young in which an
employer has to choose between assigning pregnancy disabilities to a larger
set of favored disabilities or a larger set of disfavored disabilities. Because
Guerra interpreted the PDA to be asymmetrical as well as nonuniversalistic, it required employers to treat pregnancy-based disabilities as
well as it treats any disabilities deriving from any other causes, regardless of
whether that results in the relative disfavoring of other non-protected
disabilities.81
79
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It is indeed possible that the Court’s use of a different conceptual
definition of disparate treatment in Young from that embraced two months
later in Abercrombie derived in part from the unwillingness of a majority of
the Justices to reaffirm Guerra’s interpretation of the PDA82. Absent the
reaffirmation of Guerra’s holding that the PDA is symmetrical, Young posed
a more difficult case; if -- contrary to the Guerra decision – the PDA
prohibits discrimination in favor of pregnancy symmetrically with its
prohibition of discrimination against pregnancy, then granting pregnancy
“most-favored-nation” status would require employers to treat all conditions
equally well, regardless of cause. This is because pregnancy would have to
be treated as well as a favored condition and a disfavored condition would
have to be treated as well as pregnancy. This might have seemed to the
Justices excessively restrictive of employer discretion because the PDA
certainly does not universally prohibit discrimination between other types of
disabilities, as Title VII universally prohibits all forms of race or national
origin or color discrimination.
The Court easily could have avoided a more burdensome restriction
on employers, however, without its inconsistent conceptual framing of the
disparate treatment cause of action, by reaffirming Guerra’s holding that the
PDA was intended to be asymmetrical as well as fully non-universalistic.83 It
is hard to imagine why Congress would want employees with other
conditions to have a cause of action against more favorable treatment of
pregnancy when they would not have a cause of action against more
favorable treatment of other conditions. Not surprisingly, there are no other
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discrimination prohibitions that share such a symmetrical and semiuniversalistic nature.84

V.
Notwithstanding the failure of any opinion in Young85 to provide an
adequate interpretation of the PDA, there remains reason for hope that the
conceptual problem presented by Young and Abercrombie, and addressed in
this essay, will be resolved by the Court in the future with a more expansive
and appropriate scope for disparate treatment analysis. In the first place,
Abercrombie was decided after Young and was a more direct interpretation of
the meaning of § 703(a)(1), the provision on which the disparate treatment
cause of action is based. The Justices in Abercrombie, unlike in Young, were
not distracted by the need to interpret an ambiguous secondary clause in an
amendment to Title VII or by specious arguments about most favored nations.
Perhaps the very incoherence and unpredictable meaning of Justice Breyer’s
majority in Young may make it more likely that the Court will have to decide
another PDA case86 in which advocates for a more expansive interpretation of
the statute will get a second chance to argue for a broader definition of
disparate treatment in line with the Abercrombie Court’s treatment of the
religious discrimination proscribed by Title VII.87
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It may be more likely, however, that the issue addressed in this essay
will arise again under one of the other two principal federal antidiscrimination
statutes, the ADA and the ADEA, both of which share with religious practice
and pregnancy discrimination under Title VII, the asymmetric and nonuniversalistic characteristics that make defining disparate treatment most
difficult. The 2008 amendments to the former statute88 may render it
especially likely to present a case where an employer discriminates against a
protected group, defined by disability status, by including the protected group
within a larger, neutrally defined disfavored group. The 2008 amendments
(ADAAA) make this more likely because they enlarge the ADA’s class
protected from employment discrimination – in contrast to those due
reasonable accommodation -- to include anyone with an impairment,
regardless of any limitation of a major life activity.89 Since regulations under
the ADA define impairment to include “[a]ny physiological disorder or
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one of more
body systems” or “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder,”90 an employer’s
disfavoring of the overweight or the underweight or the short or the tall or the
less mentally adroit or physically attractive almost certainly will discriminate
against a subset of protected impaired individuals. An employer that refuses
to employ the physically unattractive for certain public interface jobs, for
instance, might assign anyone with a “cosmetic disfigurement” to this larger
disfavored class.91 The Court then may be confronted again, perhaps more
directly and with greater focus, with arguments that such discrimination
should be treated as intentional discrimination under disparate treatment
analysis, rather than merely as the disparate impact of a neutral policy.
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